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1 Introduction 
Significant investment is required for the development of construction projects. An 
appropriate procurement and contract strategy is therefore necessary to protect such 
investment and to achieve value for money for clients and investors who have a stake 
over the long-term use of such facilities. However, clients are often faced with the 
dilemma of how to procure construction projects and what type of contract to use to 
ensure that projects are delivered in the most cost effective and efficient, and most 
significantly to ensure that the facilities is fit for the purpose intended. In deciding 
what procurement strategy to adopt, it is important to understand the key drivers of 
change or factors that will or are likely to affect the particular sector or industry the 
project is operating in.  
 
The central dilemma for clients is often how to select consultants and contractors 
(with an information advantage) that can act in their best interests in the project. This 
information asymmetry gives rise to two fundamental problems. The first is what is 
usually referred to as ‘incomplete contracts’, lacking sufficient precision to define the  
project, cover the entire scope of work including all possible risks. The greater the 
completeness of contract documentation, the lower the potential for dispute, abuse 
and opportunism but it is difficult to achieve this in real world contracts. Second, it 
creates the potential for abuse and mistrust in the relationships between various 
parties.   
 
This chapter examines the link between procurement and contract strategy, the role of 
contracts in allocating risks, and the relationship between parties in various types of 
procurement as well as the implications for construction cost. It starts with an overview 
of the need for an effective procurement and contract strategy. The key risks in relations 
to the different forms of contract, mechanisms for the allocation of risks from 
traditional architect-led approaches to integrated fast-track methods of delivering 
projects are discussed.  
 
 
2. Procurement Strategy and Contract Selection 
Procurement strategy and the form of contract chosen can have a significant impact 
on the cost and time overruns in major projects. Procurement involves actors (public 
and private organisations such as design and construction firms) and the organisation 
of activities (from planning, design, construction to operation and maintenance) to 
deliver an asset (Howes and Robinson, 2005). The project stages are generally 
sequential but there are overlaps between certain activities such as design and 
construction and sub-activities or packages such as concreting and formwork. The 
degree of overlap depends on the choice of procurement method. For example, in 
traditional procurement, there is very little overlap between the design and construction 
stages compared to ‘design and build’ where there is a significant overlap.  
 
Within each stage of the procurement process, different actors involved have various 
expectations which can sometimes conflict, create risks with potential cost 
consequences. For example, whilst an architect might have a preference for an 
innovative approach which poses additional risks, the structural engineer’s proposed 
solution could affect the architect’s desired shape and form of the design and the 
appetite for risks. Similarly, the services engineer might have a preference for running 
service ducts in a particular way or direction but this could affect the work of the fit-out 
specialists in terms of patterns or space configuration. The nature of these interactions 
and the risks involved in the design process could also affect the construction cost or 
budget set by the quantity surveyor or cost engineer.  
 
The nature of interaction of the key actors depends on the procurement option chosen 
which defines the actors involved, their role, at what stage they are involved in and the 
precise relationship between, for example, the client, architects, structural engineers, 
quantity surveyors and fit out specialists. In traditional procurement system, the builder 
and facilities management consultant has no input in design which could affect the way 
the building is constructed and operated. This is in sharp contrast to other approaches 
such as ‘design and build’ procurement with a major input on ‘buildability’ at an early 
stage or PPP/ UK PFI procurement system, where the facilities management consultant 
has a significant input  in the design as a greater emphasis is placed on the functionality 
and flexibility of the buildings during use. There is a need to select an appropriate 
procurement and contract strategy to govern the relationships between key actors, 
clients and consultants, contractors and specialist subcontractors. It is important to 
ensure that these two elements are carefully considered as they are intrinsically 
linked. First, the procurement strategy provides the ‘direction and speed of travel’ and 
second, the selection of the appropriate contract forms reflects the client’s appetite for 
risk and ‘level of comfort in the journey’ to deliver a construction project. These are 
major decisions which the client cannot afford to get wrong as it will have significant 
implications on the costs and the time taken to deliver a project. 
 
The key to a successful procurement strategy and contract selection is to identify the 
priorities in the client’s objectives and to plan a journey or path that will deliver the 
project on time, within budget and to the required specification. Procurement routes 
depend on a range of factors such as the type of project, expected project completion 
date, relationship between key parties and the allocation of risks. For example, it is 
widely accepted that the traditional procurement method places more risk on the client 
but the design and build approach allocates more risk to the contractor. The type of 
contracts also plays a key role in the allocation of risk to different parties. Selecting a 
construction contract is dependent on a number of criteria which include but are not 
limited to the type of work , value of work, expertise of client and amount of control 
required, programme requirements and importance of price certainty. The process of 
choosing a contract type should therefore satisfy the requirements of the project to 
ensure that risk allocation is appropriate based on the needs of stakeholders - clients, 
consultants, contractors and sub-contractors.  
 
 
 
3. Wembley Stadium Case Study 
In October 2000, Wembley stadium was closed and demolished in late 2002 for a 
major redevelopment of an iconic stadium. The aim of the Wembley project was to 
design and build a state-of-the-art national stadium to be the home of English football 
and to host large events such as cup finals and music events and athletics. The roof 
structure covers 11 acres, 4 acres of which are movable. The 90,000 seat capacity 
makes it the second largest stadium in Europe next to the Nou Camp in Barcelona 
with a capacity of 98, 000, but it is one of the largest in the World to have a covering 
roof. There are 310 wheelchair spaces and increased capacity for other physical 
impaired spectators. In addition, there are 400 media seats, 2,618 toilets and four 
banqueting halls, the largest of which can accommodate 2,000. 
 
The procurement system used for the development of the Wembley stadium project 
was design and build and the form of contract used was the guaranteed maximum 
price (GMP). According to Construction Manager (2006, pp.12), “Politicians 
perceive GMP contracts as a panacea for all cost overrun”.  The managing director 
of WNSL was certain that the project was well defined and was not going to be 
subject to many changes (Construction Manager, 2006, p.13). This type of contract 
was said to be good for clients who want to make sure they will spend no more money 
than they have budgeted for. In Feb 2000, some of the potential bidders such as Sir 
Robert McAlpine and Bouyges pulled out of the bidding process because of serious 
concerns about the form of contract proposed.  
 
Key Parties  
The client was Wembley National Stadium Limited (WNSL) and the architect 
employed was Foster and Partners and HOK Sport, one of the world’s leading design 
firm and provider of project delivery services. They employ about 1,600 professionals 
across America, Europe and Asia. The main contractor was Multiplex Ltd, an 
Australian based contractor, part of a group employing over 2,000 people with 
established operations in Australia, New Zealand, United Kingdom and the Middle 
East. There were also a number of specialist subcontractors involved. The original 
steel sub-contractor was Cleveland Bridge but they were eventually replaced by 
Hollandia (designbuild-network.com 2006). The mechanical and electrical contractor 
was Emcor Drake & Scull and the building services engineering was carried out by 
Mott MacDonald. There were a number of other engineers and consultants involved. 
 
Project Implementation 
According to sportengland.org (2007), Multiplex had secured a design and build 
contract to build the new Wembley Stadium. The total construction cost was put at 
£326.5m but by the time the bid had been signed, the cost increased to £445m. In 
September 2000 just after Wembley Stadium Ltd had announced that it had chosen 
Multiplex Ltd as the contractor, there were delays as politicians argued over what 
Wembley should be used for. They also had trouble attracting investors, costs began 
to escalate and the design went back to the drawing board several times (Construction 
Manager 2006, pp.13). The initial target completion date was to May 2003, but work 
started in September/October 2002. The revised completion date set was March 2006 
before the May 2006 FA Cup final, by which time the price of the stadium had risen 
to £757m. During the implementation, the relationship between Multiplex and its steel 
subcontractors, Cleveland Bridge, was problematic. As a result, Cleveland Bridge left 
the site in 2004 because they did not believe they would be paid for materials and 
there were serious difficulties between the two parties (designbuild-network.com 2006).  
According to Construction Manager (2005, pp.19) both parties appeared in a court case on 
26th April 2006. Cleveland Bridge claims that there were serious problems as a result of late 
and incomplete design which has caused cost increases and 50.5 week delay. According to 
designbuild-network (2006), the two companies sued each other for breach of contract. 
Multiplex sued for £45m   and Cleveland Bridge sued for £22.5m. In Multiplex Constructions 
(UK) Ltd v Cleveland Bridge UK Ltd & Anor [2008] EWHC 2220 (TCC)   Mr Justice Jackson 
(as he was then), found in favour of Multiplex. Of his long and comprehensive judgment he 
said that it was likely to have few readers. 
 
In November 2005, the Construction Manager, under one of its articles titled “more 
than a stadium” had an interview with Mike Richardson of the Wembley Stadium. 
The tone of an unhappy client was cited as Mike Richardson said; 
 
         “We cannot tell them how to build a job or who to use. They’ve got a fixed price 
for this job……we are not a risk transfer organisation. Every time we change our 
minds they have the opportunity to say that wasn’t in our original price. So the 
trick is not to change your mind too often” 
 
In 2006 multiplex had estimated losses rising to £106m according to Construction 
Manager (2006, pp. 13). Multiplex intended to claim £150 from WNSL for 560 
design changes and according to Construction News (2006, pp.2) Multiplex 
confirmed that its losses on the Wembley contract was at £180 million.  The stadium 
was completed in March 2007 and was ready for the 2007 FA Cup final. The final 
construction cost was £798m with an additional time overrun of 12 months.  
 
 
3. Allocation of Risks and Forms of Contract 
The construction of the new Wembley Stadium is a landmark project which has been 
controversial and fascinating but raises important issues about how to allocate risks 
appropriately. The parties were highly experienced and had access to high level legal 
advice. Despite this it spawned at least 25 cases and numerous adjudications. It raises 
important questions about the procurement strategy (design and build) and the 
secondary process of actual construction. It is imperative that the form of contract is 
used to support the procurement method ensuring that it is sufficiently detailed and 
clear to accommodate both the client and the contractor’s appetite for risks. If 
appropriate decisions about risks allocation are not taken during the early stage of a 
project, it can have a significant impact on final cost and duration of a project.  
Risks are varied in construction work. Some are known at the time of contracting. 
Examples are that the completion date which is crucial e.g. a supermarket or an 
Olympic stadium. In others the financial consequences of late completion is known: 
in Masons (A Firm) v WD King Ltd & anor [2003] EWHC 3124 (TCC), the parties 
knew that if the completion date was not met losses for the year would amount to 
£600K. In Copthorne Hotel (Newcastle) Limited v. Arup Associates and anor (1996) 
12 Const LJ 402, the risk created by a medieval wall close to the site of piling meant 
all the piling subcontrcators inflated their prices to cover the risk. 
There are other factors that can also affect the progress of the work. Chief of these are 
the unforeseen risks such as: (a) unexpected ground conditions (b) unpredicted 
weather conditions (c) shortages of material and skilled labour (d) accidents, whether 
by fire, flood or carelessness and (f) innovative design that does not work or proves 
impossible to construct. As a result, the allocation of these risks is a very important 
part of the contract since these factors always result in additional costs being incurred. 
This inevitably raises the question of who should pay (Adriaanse 2010). 
Risk and uncertainties are part of construction work regardless of the size of the 
project. The selection of a particular form of contract can affect the balance of risks or 
can shift particular risks towards one of the stakeholders.  There are various forms of 
contracts which define the relationship of the parties in a construction contract and 
risks allocation through contract clauses and conditions. For example, there are 
clauses relating to modification of design or quality where circumstances in which the 
work is carried out changes and the consequences for such changes,  valuation of the 
cost consequences due to design variations, claims where contractors are entitled to 
additional payments, dealing with unforeseen events, interim payments for regular 
work progress, extension of time,  and the cost implication of extension of time which 
are all essential in  contract management to ensure the smooth running of construction 
projects. The precise wording of the clauses is also important as they are potential 
sources of conflicts between different parties involved and can lead to delays and cost 
overruns. 
 
An appropriate contract form is therefore required to work in conjunction with the 
chosen procurement method. The selection of the procurement route will directly 
affect the contract options available. There are numerous standard forms of contract 
available. However, the most commonly used contracts are the Joint Contracts 
Tribunal (JCT) and the New Engineering Contract (NEC). The International 
Federation of Consulting Engineers (FIDIC) which is similar to the ICE contract is 
used mostly on international projects. Contracts can also be bespoke or tailored to the 
specific requirements of the parties but can be costly and time consuming process 
compared to utilising the standard forms.  
 
 
4. Risks and Construction Costs 
There are number of approaches used to deal with the problems of risks. For example, 
by choosing a particular form of contract, incorporating special provisions in a 
contract or by creating or increasing the contingency funds available. Care has to be 
taken when considering bespoke amendment to standard forms of contract. They are 
usually drafted by a committee drawn from the industry and as such represent a 
consensus on the allocation of risk. Amendments need to be made sensitively on order 
not to disturb that allocation. 
 
At the heart of the standard form is the doctrine of privity of contract and ways of 
dealing with it. At tender stage provisions need to be inserted to provide protection for 
the employer and third parties. For the employer, direct warranties are needed to 
allocate rights against subcontractors and suppliers (these are additional to that owed 
by the contractor to the employer). The JCT family of contracts also allows for the 
provision of Collateral Warranties or the use the Contract (Rights of Third Parties) 
Act 1999). These also provide protection against contractor insolvency by providing 
‘step-in’ rights for the developer or client should this occur.  In addition it provides 
for termination of the employment of the contractor for specified defaults and most 
important for the financial consequences that follow.  The contractor is also required 
to take out joint insurances to provide cover against construction activities causing 
damage to third parties.  
 
There are other types of risk indirectly affecting a project such as disruption to third 
party business (e.g. traffic, noise, business closure etc), industry risk which might 
affect the entire industry (e.g. national strike involving building workers) and 
corporate activities of the design and construction firms involved in a project which 
may have serious business consequences. 
 
Risks should be examined at an overall project level as well as a detailed level 
looking at specific clauses of a contract. At a project level, if a client is interesting in 
price certainty, the lump sum (fixed price) contract would be the most appropriate as 
the final cost is determined prior to start of the construction. This contract can be 
agreed either ‘with quantities’ or ‘without quantities’. Regardless of the agreed lump 
sum cost for the works, any variations to the project will result in additional costs. 
There is also the option of using ‘measurement contracts’ where the client retains the 
risks as the final contract sum is not agreed until the project is completed. This type of 
contract is often used in projects, particularly refurbishment projects, where the extent 
of the work cannot be quantified or is not clearly defined at the tender stage.  The 
client takes the risk regarding the final quantity. If this increases substantially then the 
agreed rate for the works would result in a considerable cost increase to the client. 
Cost reimbursement (sometimes called cost plus) contracts are also used based on the 
cost for labour, plant and materials and an agreed overhead and profit percentage is 
added to this amount. This type of contract places a high level of risk on the client to 
pay for construction work without sufficient or detailed knowledge of the true cost 
which can sometimes provide little or limited incentive for the contractor to keep 
construction costs down. There is an alternative incentive based contract such as 
guaranteed maximum price (GMP) contracts or pain-gain sharing sometimes called 
target cost contracts to provide an incentive for contractors to keep costs down by 
sharing the savings made during construction with the client. 
 
Risks should also be examined at the detailed level looking at specific contract 
clauses which can affect project performance, design quality and the budget of a 
project. Risks can sometimes be eliminated by a complete re-design of schemes or 
elements of the design by client’s architect, minimised by choosing a traditional 
design rather an innovative design solution, transferred, for example, through design 
and build contracts or passed on to specialist sub-contractors. The options to manage 
risks will consider the potential costs for risk transfer, containment and risk reduction 
policies such as insurance. In practice, the distribution of risk is analysed through a 
comprehensive risk matrix or register and appropriate project costs are allowed for or 
added (value of risks) during the estimating process. Examples of risk may include 
design errors, inaccurate cost estimates, inflation, poor site and ground conditions, 
variations in weather, labour availability, hidden defects and quality of materials.  
Risk response strategy and appropriate mitigating instruments will be required (see 
examples in Tables 1 and 2).   
 
 
 
 
 Table 1: Examples of Risk Response Strategy 
 
Risk Strategy Examples 
Eliminate/Avoid Eliminate potential threats to project e.g. review design 
processes, change design, adopt alternative construction 
technique or use new materials  
Distribute/Share Introduce a pain/gain sharing mechanism e.g. Guaranteed 
Maximum Price (GMP) contract,  
Transfer Does not reduce criticality; move to another party best able to 
manage it e.g.  contractual provisions or insurance 
Use lump sum (transfer to contractor) or  
cost plus contracts (transfer to client)   
Accept/Retain/Reduce   Other options are undesirable, uneconomical or impossible e.g. 
can reduce risk by in-depth site investigation   
 
 
Risks should be analysed in an organised and systematic way considering the full 
impact on programme time and cost overruns. Too often risks are dealt with in an 
arbitrary way or ad hoc fashion by simply adding a percentage for contingency on the 
estimated project cost. Irrespective of the type of contract chosen (whether fixed 
price, cost plus or guaranteed maximum price), there will always be a need for the 
client or contractor to avoid cost and time overruns in construction projects. Adopting 
a systematic risk management approach to itemise and quantify all the risks involved, 
whether it is in the form of measured works in the bill of quantities or special 
conditions of contract, is essential to manage project time and cost effectively. 
 
Table 2: Examples of risks mitigating instruments 
 
Risks 
 
Mitigating Instruments 
 
Design Professional Indemnity Insurance 
Cost Overruns 
Inflation 
Standby Credit 
Contingency Funds 
Contract Clauses 
Delays Liquidated Damages 
Hidden Defects Contractual Arrangements 
Force Majeure Insurance 
 
 
5. Procurement systems and Contract Issues 
 
5.1 Architect-led or traditional system 
 
In the architect-led or traditional system, contractors are invited to tender on the basis 
of complete drawings, specification and other contract documents defining the scope 
of the work. Competitive tendering is based on complete design such as key design 
drawings, specification, bills of quantities. Co-ordination by the architect or lead 
designer is absolutely critical in relations to specialist contractors responsible for the 
building structure (core and shell), services, and the fit -out work or configuration of 
spaces and building elements. Co-ordination only links at the design level are shown in 
dotted lines below and the other lines reflects the contractual and co-ordination links. 
Figure 1: Traditional System 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The contractor is selected based on price, and other technical factors such as time for 
completion, sustainability, health and safety strategy and project programme. The 
lowest tender or best value bid is traditionally accepted, provided all other technical 
requirements are met. This process of not involving the contractor until a later stage 
removes the benefits of the builders input to the design. The design teams may not be 
able to effectively maximise cost and programme savings because the majority of the 
design is complete.  
 
The JCT Standard Form contract (SFC 11) now provide for the provision of a 
‘Contractor designed Portion’.  This allows the employer to place design liability on 
the contractor for specified work. In allowing for this, part of the criticism made 
above is addressed. 
 
Changes in the work scope (variations) and employer delay are the substantial drivers 
in unexpected costs. The SFC JCT 11 deals with delay caused by the employer and its 
consequences, as well as delay due to variations, in the same way. Delay due by the 
contractor is dealt with by levying Liquidated Damages. The scheme to protect the 
right to such sums is provided by the provision of ‘relevant’ events (clause 2.29), 
which enable the contractor to make a claim for an extension of time. These are 
events which should they occur is at the expense of the employer. What this should 
mean in practice is the likelihood of the risks occurring is borne by the employer and 
should attract a lower price from the contractor who has not to price for it. In addition, 
the contractor is entitled to claim for costs arising which are not covered by any other 
provision in the contract.  Clause 4.24 lists the relevant matters that entitle the 
contractor to these costs. Keating states that it difficult to conceive of circumstances 
where the employer under a JCT contract could lose its right to Liquidated damages. 
As the Privy Council stated in Phillips Hong Kong v the Attorney General of Hong 
Kong  (1993) 61 BLR 41 ‘in building contracts...parties should know with reasonable 
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certainty what their liability [for damages] is under the contract’. The scheme for 
dealing with damages in construction contracts has been comprehensively analysed by 
Adriaanse (Bear 08) in the rule in Hadley v Baxendale (1854) and the standard forms of 
contract 
 
The approach taken by the NEC3 contract is radically different to that usually found 
in other construction contracts. For a start The Engineering and Construction Contract 
(NEC 3) in its Secondary Option clause: Option X7 provides for the employer to opt 
to levy Delay (Liquidated) Damages (instead of relying on its common law rights). 
Delay and its consequences is managed through ‘compensation’ events. A 
compensation event is one that arises through no fault of the contractor.  It 
compensates for any delay not caused by the contractor (a potentially wide exposure 
to risk). Clause 60.1 comprises nineteen events, and unlike other contract such as the 
JCT 11, deals with the consequences of the delay and the costs associated with it at 
the same time. Quite substantial workload is caused by the operation of the procedure 
required to operate the system. In addition the compensation event can also involve 
the requirement to give early warning (clause 16) and risk reduction meetings 
required by clause 16. Compensation events require: 
 
1. Notification of the event 
2. Submission of alteration to the accepted programme together with quotations 
for carrying out the work 
3. Preparation and submission of quotations (also time and money under clause 
63) 
4. Implementation of the Compensation events clause 63 
Limiting the design liability in the JCT 11 is done by limiting the contractors’ design 
liability to that of a professional person and the limiting of consequential loss arising 
from such a failure is limited to a sum fixed in the appendix.   The NEC 3 also adopts 
the same approach.  
 
  
 
5.2 Design and Build 
Design and build sometimes called ‘package deal’ is a significantly different from the 
traditional system. The approach involves a significant overlap between design and 
construction activities. The client appoints a ‘design and build’ or ‘develop and 
construct’ contractor so there is a single point of responsibility and more significantly 
crucial construction input is provided at an early stage, unlike the traditional 
approach.  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Design and Build Approach 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
If the design is carried out by the contractor, it limits the client’s responsibility for 
design defects by transferring risk from the client to the principal contractor and their 
consultants. The client must determine whether the additional cost spent on the 
contractor taking the additional risk can be offset by the potential savings. The variant 
termed ‘develop and construct’ is where the client has a concept or scheme design 
which is completed by the contractor. The use of  this variant of D&B procurement 
method whereby clients use consultants to design a project up to a particular stage and 
then have contractors price the project is sometimes criticised as it can create complex 
issues.  
 
Some clients may not wish to become too involved in the design process. The key in 
the early stages of a design and build project is  to appoint an adviser to develop 
appropriate briefing and design concepts to ensure that flexibility in design is 
achieved through better coordination of structure, services and equipment, fit-out and 
space planning elements.  If an adequate brief and a statement of client’s requirements 
are prepared, design and build could offer an integrated package to ensure good co-
ordination between the design and construction teams. The D&B contractor is usually 
appointed on the basis of pre-qualification and negotiation leading to the agreement of 
a guaranteed maximum price (GMP) for a finalised design and specification. 
Alternatively, the appointment can be made on the basis of competitive bids usually 
consisting of design proposals and lump sum prices. This procurement method does 
not offer so much flexibility compared to that of the traditional approach and changes 
after the design has been agreed are usually more expensive to incorporate. Often the 
client is exposed to the risk of receiving a finished product that satisfies the 
Contractor’s Proposals (CPs) in the contract but does not give the client the desired 
end product originally anticipated. 
 
Design & build contracts are available for the D&B procurement route. The JCT 
Design and Build contract Form contract D&B11, also provide for ‘Changes’ in 
Section 5.These are variations in the traditional contract. Changes in the work due to 
employer delay are as pointed out above, the main drivers in unexpected costs. Delay 
due by the contractor is dealt with by levying Liquidated damages. The scheme to 
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protect the right to such sums is provided by the provision of ‘relevant’ events (clause 
2.26). These are events should they occur is at the expense of the employer. What this 
means is that the risks of these is borne by the employer and should attract a lower 
price from the contractor who has not to price for it. In addition the contractor is 
entitled to claim for costs arising which are not covered by any other provision in the 
contract.  Clause 4.20 lists the relevant matters that entitle the contractor to these 
costs.   
 
A key issue here is design liability. In the Traditional contract, the interface between 
design and workmanship is called the ‘fuzzy edge’. Placing design liability on the 
contractor is meant to resolve this issue. In practice, the contractor whether employed 
under as traditional contract or under a D&B contract neither designs nor builds but 
instead manages the process (Adriaanse, CIB World Conference). A view confirmed 
by HHJ Lloyd who said  in Birse Construction Ltd v Eastern Telegraph Company Ltd 
[2004] EWHC 2512 (TCC) that : 
‘on virtually all building contracts of any magnitude, the role of the contractor is to 
use his management know-how not only to procure the requisite skills but also to 
know whether and to what extent they are being provided adequately to meet the 
requirements of the contract.’ 
 
The Standard forms of contract (JCT/NEC) limit the liability of the contractor, in 
design to that of the exercise of reasonable care and skill. By contrast the design 
liability of a contractor at common law is that of fitness for purpose. In practice the 
contractor will subcontract the design and construction to either professional 
consultants or specialist design subcontractors’ (who will in turn employ professional 
consultants). The result is that the fuzzy edge is pushed down the chain. The 
consequence is best summed-up by Cliffe (Holdings) Ltd v Parkman Buck Ltd (1997) 
14-CLD-07-04, HHJ Wilcox QC, OR observed that: 
 
the contractor may supplant the architects in some of their traditional roles as 
exemplified under a full (JCT) agreement. In particular, involvement in the 
choice and the co-ordination of the specialist systems and sub-contractors, the 
integration of those systems, the approval of all drawings and site supervision. 
The result may achieve economies and render the tendering contractor more 
economic. It does however put a premium upon the strength of the organisation 
and experience of the contractor in the enhanced role it plays in such a contract. 
Merely by employing an architect in a restricted role, such in this case, can it 
expect the architect to compensate for the shortcomings of the other sub-
contractors. 
 
The employer in fact has to balance what it is receiving in its procurement system 
from what it thinks it is receiving. If parties are aware of the risk allocation, they will 
price their risk and exposure better. This may well mean that the client could abandon 
the project. In the well known case of Pacific Associates Inc and anor v Baxter and 
ors (1988) 44 BLR 33, hard materials in the underlying soils were not found during 
the site investigation. Although the contractor won damages in the resulting 
arbitration its losses far exceeded its winnings. Had the client known the true nature 
of the site it might well have decided to abandon the project at the start.  
  
5.3 Management contracting  
Management contracting is also a slight variation from the traditional system. In this 
method, the design process is separated from the construction work but there are 
overlaps to speed up the procurement process. The client appoints a design team and 
also appoints a ‘manager’ often called a management contractor as a professional 
consultant at an early stage of the project usually a contractor who is paid a fee for co-
ordinating the work of subcontractors split into packages.  
 
Figure 3: Management contracting approach 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The management contractor supports the client’s design team with construction 
expertise to improve the design solutions and the ‘buildability’ of the scheme. The 
management contractor is expected to appoint works contractors to undertake discrete 
packages of work. The contractual arrangement will be between the management 
contractor and the works contractor, however it is important to realize that the client is 
duty bound to reimburse the management contractor for all costs incurred. Under this 
arrangement, the client mainly carries the risk. A major criticism of this approach has 
been the risk aversion by some clients attempting to unload significant risks to the 
management contractor. One way of doing this is by insisting that the reimbursement 
of package subcontractors will be subject to a maximum tender figure, hence any cost 
overrun, other than agreed variations, will be the responsibility of the management 
contractor. This has led to adversarial relationships, which has affected the popularity 
of this route in recent years. This procurement route has therefore largely fallen out of 
favour with some clients in the global construction market, but where conditions are 
right it may provide an appropriate solution.  
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5.4 Construction management 
 
This is a form of procurement which is similar to management contracting. The main 
difference is that the client places direct contracts with each of the specialist 
contractors and suppliers.  
 
 
Figure 4: Construction management approach 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The expert construction management specialist is appointed as a consultant whose 
task is to effectively manage and control the construction process, as well as 
integrating the design team. In this manner the client has more direct control over 
works contractors and this helps to mitigate the risk associated with management 
contracting. This implies that the client is familiar with construction and has a close 
relationship with the professional team. The expert construction manager is therefore 
appointed as a consultant whose task is to facilitate the integration of the design team 
and effectively manage and control the construction process. Overriding influences in 
the selection of this route concern the complexity of the project and the strength of the 
risk involved. 
Both the management contracting and construction management methods of 
procurement are in use but their use has declined due to the risks not being clearly 
allocated. In management contracting, the employer engages the management 
contractor to partake in the project at an early stage. Normally an experienced builder, 
the contractor is employed not to undertake the work but to manage the process. All 
the work is subcontracted to works contractors who carry it out. Construction 
management differs from management contracting in that the employer enters into a 
direct contract with each specialist. The employer engages the construction manager 
to act as a ‘consultant’ to coordinate these contractors.  It is the legal uncertainty and 
the exposure to unexpected costs that has made these unattractive to employers.  
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 6.   Alternative Forms of Procurement 
The procurement approaches discussed in the previous sections have limitations in 
terms of the durability of the relationships between clients, consultants and 
contractors. For example, in a traditional procurement, the liability of the contractor 
for rectification of defects after practical completion is normally restricted to a shorter 
period, usually 12 months.  There has been a trend towards other types of 
procurement and forms of contract that fosters long-term collaborative relationships 
and transferring operating risk for a much longer period during the operational stages 
of the facilities or assets (Robinson and Scott, 2009). In long-term procurement 
approaches such as public private partnerships (PPP) or the UK PFI model, the 
contractor is liable for the delivery of the assets and a wide range of hard and soft 
facilities management (FM) services as well as the associated operating risks during 
the performance period spanning 25-35 years.  
 
Figure 5: Contractual relationship and agreement between parties in PFI/PPP 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The public sector client and private sector consortium (SPV) need to have full range 
of skills to complete a PFI/PPP contract. Legal, technical and financial advisors are 
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appointed by the public sector to help define business requirements, develop the 
business case, deal with risk transfer, cost and affordability, payment stream, 
managing the procurement process, and to negotiate the best contract for the client.  
 
Gruneberg et al (2007) argued that ‘if a supplier has a responsibility for how 
something performs, then his or her contractual liability must extend into the 
performance period’. This approach has clearly shifted and increased the risks on the 
PFI contractor as ‘liability is inevitably extended under performance-based contracts’ 
(Gruneberg et al, 2007).  The PFI process involves exploring risk allocation and the 
value of risk transfer compared to the traditional route. There are various risks 
associated with planning and design development, construction, and operation of 
PFI/PPP projects. For example, design and construction risks are retained by 
SPV/contractor but such risks are transferred to the ‘design and build’ subcontractor 
where it is a separate firm. Operational risks relating to life cycle costs, innovation 
and technological changes are transferred to FM companies/subcontractors. Table 3 
shows a simple example of how risk of cost overrun is valued based on the probability 
and the cost of the event. The project estimated construction cost is £ 200 million and 
the likelihood of cost overrun reflecting various risks is shown to amount to £17 
million.  
 
Table 3:  Value of risk in PFI/PPP projects 
 
Scenario:  Probability 
of event (A) 
Cost of event 
(B) (£ 
million) 
Value of risk 
(C) = (A) x (B)  
(£ million) 
Projected completed below 
budget  by £10 m 
0.10 - 10 - 1.0 
Project completed on budget 0.20     0    0.0 
Project overrun by £20 million 0.40 + 20 + 8.0 
Project overrun by £30 million 0.20 + 30 + 6.0 
Project overrun by £40 million 0.10 + 40 + 4.0 
Risk Adjustment to Project 
Cost 
  + 17.0 
 
 
Risk is valued based on (A) the probability of the event occurring and (B) the costs 
should the event occur. For each risk event, the process is repeated to arrive at an 
estimate of the cost or financial consequences. Typically, PFI projects seemed to 
value risk transfer at around 30-35% of construction costs (ACCA, 2004).The UK PFI 
model is seen as a durable procurement approach as the responsibility for long-term use 
and flexibility of the building is transferred to the private sector based on the output 
requirements of the client. The implications are significant for the way design, 
construction and operating risks are managed which has created challenges for some and 
opportunities for others such as facilities management firms.   
 
7. Concluding Remarks 
 
The building of Wembley stadium used a D&B approach to design and construction. It 
is therefore a typical example of a ‘modern’ contract.  One that shows how outmoded the 
traditional contract is when it comes to modern methods of procurement? The disputes 
that occurred were lower in the contractual chain rather than between the employer and 
the contractor. It was still a very costly exercise for all parties. The employer also lost 
revenue. Perhaps all it demonstrates that fully prepared scope of work will always be 
superior to making it up as you go along. No matter the method of procurement, having 
a design prepared will always be better than finding out your costs as you go along. A 
good example is Plymouth & South West Co-Operative Society Ltd v Architecture, 
Structure & Management Ltd [2006] EWHC 5 (TCC). The parties operated with no 
clear means of monitoring their costs.  This resulted in an overspend of at least £2m in 
excess of the Society s estimate of about £6.3m. Knowing who takes the risk matters. 
The Wembley project was mired in dispute about delay and the resulting costs. 
Ensuring the parties who carries the risk and who has priced for it is a key to a 
successful project. As Professor Uff said in the 90th Thomas Hawksley Memorial 
Lecture citing Godfrey: ‘a full identification of construction risks and their 
management...is part of the management process’. 
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